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Notes
OLMSTEAD v. ZIMRNG: UNNECESSARY
INSTITUTIONALIZATION CONSTITUTES DISCRIMINATION
UNDER THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT
SHOSHANA FIsHmAN*
The question raised in Olmstead v. Zimring' was whether the
Americans with Disabilities Act's (ADA) prohibition on discrimination
against disabled persons requires a state to place mentally disabled
patients in community-based treatment rather than in an institution.2
The United States Supreme Court held that community placement of
disabled individuals may be necessary under the ADA, but only after
three conditions are satisfied: treating professionals have deemed
such treatment appropriate for the given patients, the patients them-
selves desire community care, and placement in community-based
programs is possible with reasonable accommodations.'
The district court granted partial summary judgment for the
plaintiffs, holding that by not placing plaintiffs in community-based
care, the State violated Title II of the ADA. 4 The Eleventh Circuit
affirmed the district court's judgment but remanded for review of the
State's "lack of funds" defense, which the district court had refused to
consider.5 The Supreme Court then granted certiorari to resolve the
issue of whether unnecessary institutionalization of mentally disabled
individuals constitutes discrimination under the ADA.6
This casenote discusses the Supreme Court's reasoning in Olin-
stead in terms of five issues. First, the standard the Court uses when
* Shoshana Fishman, J.D. candidate, 2001, University of Maryland School of Law.
1. 119 S. Ct. 2176 (1999).
2. See id. at 2181.
3. See id.
4. See Zimring v. Olmstead, 1997 WL 148674, 3-4 (N.D. Ga. 1997). The particular
section at issue, § 12132, states that "no qualified individual with a disability" can be dis-
criminated against, or denied access to or benefits of, any federally-funded program or
service. 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (1994). A "qualified individual with a disability" is defined in
section 12131(2) as, "an individual with a disability who, with or without reasonable modifi-
cations to rules, policies, or practices.. . meets the essential eligibility requirements for the
receipt of services or the participation in programs or activities provided by a public en-
tity." Id. § 12131(2).
5. See Zimring v. Olmstead, 138 F.3d 893, 905 (11th Cir. 1998).
6. See Olmstead, 119 S. Ct. at 2185.
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analyzing discrimination under the ADA differs from that used in the
past under § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act.7 In addition, the Court
cites little support or authority for the per se definition of discrimina-
tion it adopts in this case.8 Fortunately, the Court prevents some of
the confusion likely to result from its divergence from established pre-
cedent by countering its broad definition of discrimination with nar-
row definitions for other terms used in the provisions in question.9
Next, the Court gives states some necessary leeway, after the first part
of the opinion seems to place very strict requirements on the states, by
declaring that the standard for reasonable modifications will be deter-
mined on a case-by-case basis."0 Finally, the Court's holding in Olm-
stead has a possible negative application."
I. THE CASE
The situation at hand in Olmstead v. Zimingbegan when two men-
tally disabled women, referred to as E.W. and L.C. to maintain their
privacy, brought a claim seeking placement in community-based treat-
ment, as opposed to institutionalized care. 2 Each remained institu-
tionalized for at least one year after being deemed qualified for
community care by psychiatric professionals. 3 L.C. filed suit in the
United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia,
claiming that her continued institutionalization violated Title II of the
ADA because she was not provided with care in the most integrated
setting appropriate to her needs.' 4 She requested placement in a
community-based treatment facility. 15 E.W. then intervened in the
suit, claiming the same violation and seeking the same remedy.' 6
7. See infra notes 119-130 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 131-149 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 150-163 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 164-172 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 173-176 and accompanying text.
12. See Olmstead v. Zimring, 119 S. Ct. 2176, 2183 (1999).
13. See id.
14. See Zimring v. Olmstead, 138 F.3d 893, 895 (lth Cir. 1998) (citing 42 U.S.C.
§§ 12131-12134 (1995) and 28 C.F.R. § 35.130 (1997) as the specific provisions claimed to
have been violated). Plaintiff also raised a claim under the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, but the district court resolved the case solely on statutory
grounds. As a result, neither the Eleventh Circuit nor the Supreme Court could consider
the constitutional claim. See id. (citing Citro Florida, Inc. v. Citrovale, S.A., 760 F.2d 1231
(11th Cir. 1985)); see also Olmstead, 119 S. Ct. at 2181 (citing Cleburne v. Cleburne Living
Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432 (1985)).
15. See Olmstead, 119 S. Ct. at 2184.
16. See id
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L.C. and E.W. were granted partial summary judgment by the dis-
trict court and awarded declaratory and injunctive relief.17 The court
held that the State (referring to all of the named defendants) violated
the anti-discrimination mandate of Title II of the ADA by keeping the
plaintiffs institutionalized instead of placing them in community
care. 1" Enjoining the State from further impingement on the plain-
tiffs' rights, the court ordered that both be placed in community-
based treatment centers and that the State provide the services neces-
sary to maintain that placement.1 9
The court rejected the State's argument that its failure to place
the plaintiffs in community care was based on a shortage of funding
rather than discrimination, and ruled that unnecessary institutional-
ization, even without proof of inappropriate intent, constitutes dis-
crimination per se under the ADA.2" The State also asserted a
"fundamental alteration" defense, claiming that the court's interven-
tion would fundamentally alter its mental health treatment program
in a financial sense.21 But, after doing its own analysis of the State's
financial situation, the court found little credibility to this argument.22
As a result, the district court "found that the State's purported lack of
funds to provide community-based services to L.C. and E.W. was insuf-
ficient as a matter of law to establish that providing community-based
care to plaintiffs would constitute a fundamental alteration."
23
The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's holding that
keeping the plaintiffs unnecessarily institutionalized constituted dis-
crimination, but remanded the case for further analysis of the State's
"fundamental alteration" defense.24 On appeal, the State contended
that a finding of discrimination required first a comparison of dis-
abled individuals with their non-disabled counterparts.25 The court's
version of the State's argument was "that Title II of the ADA affords
no protection to individuals with disabilities who receive public serv-
ices designed only for individuals with disabilities," 26 an interpretation
of the ADA for which the State demonstrated no authority, and which
17. See Zimring, 138 F.3d at 895.
18. See Olmstead, 119 S. Ct. at 2184.
19. See Zimring, 138 F.3d at 895 (explaining that both plaintiffs had a history of re-
peated placement in and removal from institutional care).
20. See Olmstead, 119 S. Ct. at 2184.
21. See id
22. See id; see also Zimring, 138 F.3d at 904 (explaining that the district court found that
the cost of community-based care was less than that of institutional care).
23. Zimring, 138 F.3d at 904.
24. See id at 895.
25. See id at 896.
26. Id
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the court therefore rejected. 27 After discussing the plain language of
the statute, the legislative history of the ADA and its corresponding
regulations, and the Congressional intent behind the legislation, the
Eleventh Circuit concluded that, "where, as here, a disabled individ-
ual's treating professionals find that a community-based placement is
appropriate for that individual, the ADA imposes a duty to provide
treatment in a community setting - the most integrated setting ap-
propriate to that patient's needs."28
The Eleventh Circuit reviewed the district court's outright dismis-
sal of the State's "lack of funds" defense regarding the reasonable
modifications sought by the plaintiffs and remanded this issue to the
district court.29 While the Eleventh Circuit emphasized that having to
spend additional funds to provide non-discriminatory treatment is not
a valid defense under the ADA, it admitted that if those additional
expenditures are so unreasonable as to cause fundamental alterations
in the mental health services provided state-wide, the State may have
justification for continued institutionalization of the plaintiffs." The
presumption remains that the State is required to spend the addi-
tional money needed to provide mental health care that complies with
the ADA's prohibition on discrimination, but it is possible for the
State to rebut that presumption."' Since the district court did not
even consider that possibility and "because of the complexity of the
factual issues concerning the funding for mental health services in
Georgia," 2 the Eleventh Circuit remanded the case to the district
court to determine whether the State could demonstrate a fundamen-
tal alteration in its mental health program because the additional ex-
penditures being required were unreasonable. 3
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve
the issue of whether unnecessary institutionalization of mentally dis-
abled individuals constitutes discrimination under the ADA.34
27. See id (explaining that the goal of the ADA is to ensure equal opportunity for
disabled individuals, which often requires providing services and accommodations to only
those who are disabled so that they may be equals with their non-disabled counterparts).
28. Id at 902.
29. See Zimring, 138 F.3d at 905.
30. See id. at 904-05.
31. See id.
32. Id.
33. See id
34. See Olmstead v. Zimring, 119 S. Ct. 2176, 2185 (1999) (mentioning that after certio-
rari had been granted, the district court rejected, on remand, the State's fundamental
alteration defense. However, the district court also declared that its decision on remand
had no impact beyond the individual plaintiffs in the case.)
2000]
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II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. History of the ADA
Congress enacted the ADA in 1990 in order to eradicate discrimi-
nation against individuals with disabilities.35 The Rehabilitation Act of
197336 and the Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights
Act of 197517 were predecessors to the ADA, and aspects of both
pieces of legislation were incorporated in the enacted version of the
ADA.3
8
The ADA consists of Titles I through III, which address, respec-
tively, discrimination in employment,39 public services funded by the
federal government,4" and public accommodations funded through
the private sector.41 Title II is the public services portion of the ADA
and is the basis for the claim in Olmstead.42 Under Congress' instruc-
tion, the Attorney General established regulations to implement sec-
tions of Title II, including section 12132. 4B In its instructions to the
Attorney General, Congress ordered that the regulations implement-
ing Title II be consistent with those regulations under § 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act which applied to recipients of federal funds.44
The resulting regulations are found in 28 C.F.R. pt. 35, several of
which are almost identical to the § 504 regulations.45 The Third Cir-
cuit, in Helen L. v. DiDario, explained the significance of the relation-
ship between § 504 and Title II regulations: "Because Congress
35. See id. at 2182.
36. 29 U.S.C. § 701 (1976).
37. 42 U.S.C. § 6001 (1976).
38. See Olmstead, 119 S. Ct. at 2181, n.1.
39. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111-17 (1994).
40. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131-65 (1994).
41. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12181-89 (1994).
42. See Olmstead, 119 S. Ct. at 2182.
43. See id. (explaining that § 12132, the specific section at issue in Olmstead, is a general
ban on discrimination by public entities against disabled individuals). Section 12132 reads:
"subject to the provisions of this subchapter, no qualified individual with a disability shall,
by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of
the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by
any such entity." 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (1994).
44. Section 504 states:
no otherwise qualified individual with a disability in the United States, as defined
in section 706(7) of this tite, shall, solely by reason of her or his disability, be
excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to dis-
crimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance
or under any program or activity conducted by any Executive agency or by the
United States Postal Service.
29 U.S.C. § 79 4 (a) (1976).
45. See Olmstead, 119 S. Ct. at 2183.
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mandated that the ADA regulations be patterned after the § 504 coor-
dination regulations, the former regulations have the force of law."
46
One such § 504 regulation, which contributed to the conflict in Olm-
stead, is known as the integration regulation and requires services to
be provided in "the most integrated setting appropriate" to persons
with disabilities.47
B. Previous Decisions Affecting Disability Discrimination Law
Several important cases have been decided under § 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act and the Developmentally Disabled Assistance and
Bill of Rights Act of 1975. One recent Third Circuit case addressed
§ 12132 of Tide II of the ADA.4 8 The cases which serve as background
for the Court's decision in Olmstead and which will be discussed infra
are Southeastern Community College v. Davis,49 Alexander v. Choate,50 Pen-
nhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman,51 and DiDario.
5 2
The U.S. Supreme Court had to decide, in Southeastern Community
College v. Davis, whether § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act required a
clinical nursing college to modify its physical qualifications in order to
grant a disabled individual admission." The plaintiff was hearing im-
paired to such an extent that she could not understand spoken words
and relied on lip-reading. 4 The nursing program directors deter-
mined her hearing impairment would prevent plaintiff from caring
safely for patients and subsequently denied plaintiff admission to the
program.55 Plaintiff filed suit, claiming that her rights under § 504,
which prohibits discrimination against an "otherwise qualified handi-
capped individual," had been violated.5 6
The district court found in favor of the defendant, concluding
that the plaintiff was not a qualified individual under § 504 and there-
fore did not have a cause of action under that statute. The Fourth
46. Helen L. v. DiDario, 46 F.3d 325, 332 (3d Cir. 1995).
47. See Olmstead, 119 S. Ct. at 2183 (quoting 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(d) (1997), which
reads, "a public entity shall administer services, programs, and activities in the most inte-
grated setting appropriate to the needs of qualified individuals with disabilities.").
48. See infra note 52.
49. 442 U.S. 397 (1979).
50. 469 U.S. 287 (1985).
51. 451 U.S. 1 (1981).
52. 46 F.3d 325 (3d Cir. 1995).
53. See Southeastern Comm. College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 400 (1979).
54. See id, at 401.
55. See id& at 401-402.
56. See id. at 402.
57. See Davis v. Southeastern Community College, 424 F.Supp. 1341, 1345-46 (E.D.N.C.
1976) (explaining that in order to be "qualified" for the nursing program, an individual
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Circuit reversed, finding that the district court erred when deciding
whether the plaintiff was "otherwise qualified" for the nursing pro-
gram,58 and adding that § 504 may place an affirmative burden on the
defendant to modify its program to accommodate disabled individuals
who, discounting their disability, are qualified for admission. 9 The
Supreme Court reversed the Fourth Circuit, agreeing with the district
court.6" The Court first found that, under § 504, "[a]n otherwise
qualified person is one who is able to meet all of a program's require-
ments in spite of his handicap."61 Further, the Court explained,
"neither the language, purpose, nor history of § 504 reveals an intent
to impose an affirmative-action obligation on all recipients of federal
funds,"6 2 thereby rejecting the Fourth Circuit's assertion that the de-
fendant failed to satisfy the burden placed on it by § 504.6" The Court
limited its holding by adding, "situations may arise where a refusal to
modify an existing program might become unreasonable and discrim-
inatory."64 Yet the Court concluded that this situation was not one
which constituted the discrimination prohibited in § 504 of the Reha-
bilitation Act.65
In Alexander v. Choate,66 a group of handicapped individuals
brought a class action suit alleging that a proposed change in the
Medicaid program to limit inpatient coverage violated § 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act.6 7 Such a change, according to the plaintiffs,
would impermissibly discriminate against the disabled, since statistical
evidence showed that a significantly higher percentage of handi-
capped patients stayed in the hospital for longer time periods than
non-handicapped patients.6" The district court held that § 504 had
not been violated because the fourteen day limitation affected all
Medicaid recipients equally, without regard to disability.69 The Sixth
Circuit reversed the district court and held that since Plaintiffs had
must have the ability to hear spoken words), rev'd, 574 F.2d 1158 (4th Cir. 1978), rev'd, 442
U.S. 397 (1979).
58. See Davis v. Southeastern Community College, 574 F.2d 1158, 1161 (4th Cir. 1978),
rev'd, 442 U.S. 397 (1979).
59. See id. at 1162.
60. See Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 404 (1979).
61. Id. at 406.
62. Id. at 411.
63. See id.
64. Id. at 412-13.
65. See id. at 413.
66. 469 U.S. 287 (1985).
67. See id. at 289-90.
68. See id.
69. SeeJennings v. Alexander, 518 F.Supp. 877, 886 (D. Tenn. 1981), rev'd, 715 F.2d
1036 (6th Cir. 1983), rev'd sub nom. Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287 (1985).
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established a prima facie case of discrimination and the State had
failed to justify its adoption of a limitation with discriminatory effect,
the State was in violation of § 504.70
After granting certiorari, the Supreme Court first ruled that dis-
criminatory intent was not a prerequisite to a finding that § 504 had
been violated. 7' The Court stated, "much of the conduct that Con-
gress sought to alter in passing the Rehabilitation Act would be diffi-
cult if not impossible to reach were the Act construed to proscribe
only conduct fueled by a discriminatory intent."72 On the other hand,
the Court elaborated, 'Just as there is reason to question whether Con-
gress intended § 504 to reach only intentional discrimination, there is
similarly reason to question whether Congress intended § 504 to em-
brace all claims of disparate-impact discrimination."73 And in this
case, the Court concluded that the behavior in question, namely the
State limiting inpatient coverage under Medicaid, does not deny
Plaintiffs access to, nor exclude them from, Medicaid services, and
therefore does not violate § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act.74
At issue in Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman75 was
the scope of the Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of
Rights Act of 197576 and, more specifically, whether that Act provided
mentally disabled individuals the substantive right to appropriate
treatment in the least restrictive environment possible. 77 The plain-
tiff, representing herself and a class of similarly situated individuals,
brought suit against Pennhurst Hospital, alleging that conditions in
the hospital were inhumane and claiming that her rights under the
Act had been violated.78 One of the remedies sought was closure of
the hospital and provision of community-based care for all residents
of the hospital. 79 Both the district court and the Third Circuit found
that the Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act
70. SeeJennings v. Alexander, 715 F.2d 1036, 1044-45 (6th Cir. 1983), rev'd sub nom.
Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287 (1985).
71. See Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 296-97 (1985).
72. Id.
73. Id, at 299.
74. See id, at 302.
75. 451 U.S. 1 (1981).
76. 42 U.S.C. § 6001 (1976).
77. See Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 5 (1981). The
particular provision in question was 42 U.S.C. § 6010, which is referred to as the bill of
rights provision and reads in part, "(2) The treatment, services, and habilitation for a per-
son with developmental disabilities should be designed to maximize the developmental
potential of the person and should be provided in the setting that is least restrictive of the
person's personal liberty." Id. at 13.
78. See id at 6.
79. See id.
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created an enforceable right to habilitation in the least restrictive set-
ting, and that Pennhurst had violated that right as related to the class
in question."0
The U.S. Supreme Court, however, reversed both lower courts
and held that the Act merely "establishes a national policy to provide
better care and treatment to the retarded and creates funding incen-
tives to induce the States to do so. " " The Court discussed the legisla-
tive history of the Act, Congressional intent, and the language of the
Act itself, and concluded that while the provisions at issue encouraged
the states to provide treatment to mentally disabled individuals in an
integrated environment, they did not require the states to establish
such treatment programs.8 2 The Court explained:
[w] e are persuaded that § 6010, when read in the context of
other more specific provisions of the Act, does no more than
express a congressional preference for certain kinds of treat-
ment. It is simply a general statement of 'findings' and, as
such, is too thin a reed to support the rights and obligations
read into it by the court below."
In sum, the Court refused to construe the Act as creating an affirma-
tive burden on the states to create community-based treatment pro-
grams for mentally disabled individuals.84
In 1995, the Third Circuit interpreted the ADA while deciding
Helen L. v. DiDario.85 Plaintiff alleged that the Pennsylvania Depart-
ment of Public Welfare discriminated against her on the basis of disa-
bility, thereby violating Title II of the ADA, by requiring that she
receive treatment in a nursing home as opposed to attendant care
services in her own home. 6 Both parties agreed that while plaintiff
was not capable of independent living, institutionalization was not
necessary because she was capable of functioning with assistance for
only certain daily activities." The district court held that the depart-
80. See Halderman v. Pennhurst State School and Hospital, 446 F. Supp. 1295, 1323-24
(E.D. Pa. 1978), affd, 612 F.2d 84 (3d Cir. 1979), rev'd, 451 U.S. 1 (1981); Halderman v.
Pennhurst State School and Hospital, 612 F.2d 84, 107 (3d Cir. 1979), rev'd, 451 U.S. 1
(1981).
81. Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 31 (1981).
82. See id at 27.
83. Id. at 19.
84. See id at 27.
85. See Helen L. v. DiDario, 46 F.3d 325 (3d Cir. 1995).
86. See id. at 327.
87. See id. at 328.
[VOL. 3:430
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ment had denied plaintiff attendant services due to a lack of funds
rather than discrimination, and therefore had not violated the ADA.88
The Third Circuit reversed the district court, holding that the
department discriminated against the plaintiff by keeping her institu-
tionalized unnecessarily, which violated Title II of the ADA.8" The
court emphasized the legislative history of the ADA, noting particu-
larly how Title II of the ADA improved upon § 504 of the Rehabilita-
tion Act by imposing stricter regulations to eliminate "pervasive"
discrimination against disabled individuals."° However, the court also
noted that the § 504 "integrated setting" aspect of its coordination
regulations was incorporated into the ADA regulations.91 The court
concluded by stating, "[t] hus, the ADA and its attendant regulations
clearly define unnecessary segregation as a form of illegal discrimina-
tion against the disabled,"92 meaning that the State violated the ADA
by keeping an individual institutionalized when appropriate, commu-
nity-based treatment programs were available.
III. SUMMARY OF COURT'S REASONING
The first question the Supreme Court addressed in Olmstead was
whether undue institutionalization constitutes discrimination by rea-
son of disability under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act.
93
Rather than engaging in an in-depth analysis of the standard neces-
sary to sustain discrimination claims, as in Title VII claims under the
Civil Rights Act of 1964,"4 the Court relied on the explicit language of
the statute to conclude that unjustified segregation is discrimination
per se under the ADA.95 In doing so, the Court rejected the State's
claim that liability for discrimination exists only once the alleged vic-
tims have demonstrated "'uneven treatment of similarly situated indi-
88. See id. at 329.
89. See id. at 332-33.
90. See id at 330-33.
91. See id at 331-32.
92. Id at 333.
93. See Olmstead v. Zimring, 119 S. Ct. 2176, 2185 (1999). The specific statute at issue
reads, "Subject to the provisions of this subchapter, no qualified individual with a disability
shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the
benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrim-
ination by any such entity." 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (1994).
94. See, e.g., Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429-30 (1971); Wards Cove Pack-
ing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 651 (1989).
95. See Olmstead, 119 S. Ct. at 2186. In the findings section of the ADA, Congress states
that "historically, society had tended to isolate and segregate individuals with disabilities,
and, despite some improvements, such forms of discrimination against individuals with
disabilities continue to be a serious and pervasive social problem." 42 U.S.C.
§ 12101 (a) (2).
2000]
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viduals,"'96 and explained that, "Congress had a more comprehensive
view of the concept of discrimination advanced in the ADA."97 How-
ever, this definition of discrimination applies only to "qualified indi-
viduals" who are disabled.9"
The Court's interpretation of a "qualified individual" is that first,
the individual has been deemed capable of living in a community-
based program by a professional and that second, the individual wants
to participate in such program.99 The Court states, "we emphasize
that nothing in the ADA or its implementing regulations condones
termination of institutional settings for persons unable to handle or
benefit from community settings."100 The Court continues, "nor is
there any federal requirement that community-based treatment be im-
posed on patients who do not desire it."' 0'1
The next issue the Court discussed was the reasonable modifica-
tions clause, which requires the State to make "reasonable modifica-
tions" to programs and services when necessary to avoid
discriminating against disabled persons.0 2 The Eleventh Circuit re-
jected the State's contention that placing the plaintiffs in community-
based care would fundamentally alter the nature of services provided
to all mental health patients due to the State's limited financial re-
sources, and concluded that only in very limited circumstances would
§ 35.130(b) (7) allow a cost-based defense to reasonable modifica-
tions. 103 The Supreme Court found the Eleventh Circuit's interpreta-
tion of the regulation too narrow, and therefore unreasonable,
because in comparing the cost of a particular individual's care to the
entire mental health budget for the state, the State could never suc-
ceed in demonstrating a "fundamental alteration. "104 The Court
explained,
96. Id. at 2186 (quoting Brief for Petitioners at 21).
97. Id. (quoting Brief for Petitioners at 21).
98. See 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (1994) (defining qualified individuals as those disabled per-
sons who, "with or without reasonable modifications . . . meet the essential eligibility re-
quirements" of the program or service).
99. See Olmstead, 119 S. Ct. at 2188.
100. Id, at 2187-88.
101. Id.
102. The specific regulation is 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b) (7) (1997), which reads, "a public
entity shall make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures when the
modifications are necessary to avoid discrimination on the basis of disability, unless the
public entity can demonstrate that making the modifications would fundamentally alter
the nature of the service, program, or activity." Id
103. See Zimring v. Olmstead, 138 F.3d 893, 902 (11th Cir. 1998).
104. See Olmstead, 119 S. Ct. at 2188-89.
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sensibly construed, the fundamental-alteration component
of the reasonable-modifications regulation would allow the
State to show that, in the allocation of available resources,
immediate relief for the plaintiffs would be inequitable,
given the responsibility the State has undertaken for the care
and treatment of a large and diverse population of persons
with mental disabilities. 1
0 5
The Court characterized the District Court's cost comparison be-
tween community and institutional care as overly simple'1 6 and went
on to describe the difficulties arising out of the practical applications
of the Eleventh Circuit's strict reading of the reasonable modifications
clause. 0 7 The majority concluded by outlining how the State could
successfully defend itself against this claim and even listed specifically
what the State would need to demonstrate in order to avoid an ad-
verse judgment under Title II of the ADA.108
Justice Kennedy wrote a two-part concurring opinion in this case,
and Justice Breyer joined the first part of that opinion.10 9 Kennedy
first emphasized the importance of relying on thejudgment of mental
health professionals while deciding if, and when, an individual is qual-
ified for placement in community-based care, describing tragic out-
comes of involuntary deinstitutionalization of mentally ill
individuals.110 He then discussed the possibility of plaintiffs suc-
ceeding on a discrimination claim under § 12132, maintaining that a
decision cannot be made in the abstract, but rather, specific facts re-
garding treatment programs in Georgia must first be evaluated."1 ' He
concluded, "without additional information regarding the details of
state-provided medical services in Georgia, we cannot address the is-
sue in the way the statute [the ADA] demands,"'1 2 and therefore con-
cured only with the majority's judgment to remand the case.1 1 3
105. Id. at 2189.
106. See id.
107. See id at 2189-90.
108. See id. (stating, "if, for example, the State were to demonstrate that it had a compre-
hensive, effectively working plan for placing qualified persons with mental disabilities in
less restrictive settings, and a waiting list that moved at a reasonable pace not controlled by
the State's endeavors to keep its institutions fully populated, the reasonable-modifications
standard would be met.")
109. See id. at 2190-91 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
110. See id at 2191-92 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (stating "it is of central importance,
then, that courts apply today's decision with great deference to the medical decisions of
the responsible, treating physicians and, as the Court makes clear, with appropriate defer-
ence to the program funding decisions of state policymakers.").
111. See id. at 2193-94 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
112. Id. at 2194 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
113. See id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
20001
JOURNAL OF HEALTH CARE LAw & POLICY
Justice Thomas wrote the dissent, and the Chief Justice and Jus-
tice Scalia joined him.11 4 The opinion primarily focused on disagree-
ment with the majority's view that unjustified institutionalization is
discrimination per se under the ADA. Thomas began with an in-
depth discussion of the proper meaning of discrimination, citing ex-
amples under the Civil Rights Act, § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, and
sections of the ADA which supported his position.1 13 He maintained
that the correct standard to use is a classic definition of discrimina-
tion, requiring "a showing that a claimant received differential treat-
ment vis-a-vis members of a different group on the basis of a statutorily
described characteristic." '116 He then enumerated the federalism con-
sequences that the majority's holding would have on the states, as well
as contending that the states will face increased litigation as a result of
the holding in this case.' 1 7 Overall, Thomas argued § 12132 of the
ADA, requiring discrimination "by reason of' an individual's disability,
had not been violated: "Continued institutional treatment of persons
who, though now deemed treatable in a community placement, must
wait their turn for placement, does not establish that the denial of
community placement occurred 'by reason of' their disability. Rather,
it establishes no more than the fact that petitioners have limited
resources."
11 8
IV. ANALYSIS
The definition of discrimination under the ADA adopted by the
Court in Olmstead was improper in light of the fact that it differs from
previously established case law and that little authority exists to sup-
port the Court's per se definition. However, the Court correctly com-
pensates for this over-broad definition by construing narrowly other
modifying terms in the provisions at issue and by giving states discre-
tion regarding required reasonable accommodations. Unfortunately,
the Court's opinion leaves room for interpretations which could lead
to negative practical applications in the states.
114. See id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
115. See id. at 2194-98 (Thomas,J., dissenting) (commenting that "until today, this Court
has never endorsed an interpretation of the term 'discrimination' that encompassed dispa-
rate treatment among members of the same protected class.").
116. Id. at 2194 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
117. See id, at 2198-99 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
118. Id, at 2199 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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A. Previous Definition of Discrimination Based on Disability
The Court's absence of reasoning on the issue of discrimination
is in stark contrast to the in-depth discussions found in previous cases
under the Rehabilitation Act" 9 and the Civil Rights Act of 1964,120
both of which have a purpose similar to that of the ADA.1 21 Previous
cases brought under § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 12 2 the predeces-
sor to Title II of the ADA, have used the "commonly understood
meaning of discrimination," which necessitates a showing that the ac-
tion in question results in a disparate impact on disabled individu-
als.1 23 In Alexander, while deciding whether a proposed change in
Medicaid inpatient coverage violated § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act,
the Supreme Court used a disparate-impact analysis: "while we reject
the boundless notion that all disparate-impact showings constitute
prima facie cases under § 504, we assume without deciding that § 504
reaches at least some conduct that has an unjustifiable disparate im-
pact upon the handicapped."' 2 4 Earlier in that opinion, the Court
indicated that the test for discrimination under the ADA may differ
from that used in other civil rights cases because a finding of inten-
tional discrimination is not a required prerequisite to sustaining a dis-
crimination claim under the ADA.125 However, the Court recognized
that the facts of the case had to be analyzed under a disparate-impact
standard to determine whether discrimination prohibited by the ADA
had occurred.1
2 6
In allowing a prima facie showing of unnecessary institutionaliza-
tion to suffice for maintaining a claim of discrimination, the majority
in Olmstead comes to the opposite conclusion as in Southeastern Commu-
nity College v. Davis.1 27 In Davis, the Court held that § 504 of the Reha-
bilitation Act did not require the State to undertake "affirmative
119. See, e.g., Southeastern Comm. College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397 (1979); Alexander v.
Choate, 469 U.S. 287 (1985).
120. See supra note 94.
121. See Olmstead v. Zimring, 119 S. Ct. 2176, 2182 (1999).
122. Section 504 states: "no otherwise qualified handicapped individual.., shall, solely
by reason of his handicap, be excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits
of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal finan-
cial assistance." 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1976).
123. See Olmstead, 119 S. Ct. at 2196 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citing several cases in
which plaintiffs needed to demonstrate that they were treated differently than non-dis-
abled individuals due to their disability).
124. Alexander, 469 U.S. at 299.
125. See id. at 295-99.
126. See id. at 300-06.
127. See 442 U.S. 397 (1979).
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efforts to overcome the disabilities caused by handicaps."' 28 The dis-
sent in Olmstead argues that the majority's opinion resurrects the bur-
den on the states rejected by the Davis Court.1 29 This may be an over-
statement since the majority's opinion in Olmstead does not require
affirmative action by the states in the sense of creating new programs.
However, the majority's opinion does demonstrate that, at a mini-
mum, a change in the general notion of discrimination against the
disabled has changed with the passage of the ADA and courts' subse-
quent interpretations.13 °
B. Insufficient Support for Per Se Definition of Discrimination
The majority's explanation for the difference between reasoning
used in cases such as Alexander and Davis and reasoning used today in
Olmstead is that "the ADA stepped up earlier measures to secure op-
portunities for people with developmental disabilities to enjoy the
benefits of community living."' 1 While the Developmentally Disabled
Assistance and Bill of Rights Act and the Rehabilitation Act both
aimed at preventing discrimination against individuals with disabili-
ties, 11 2 the ADA is the first piece of legislation in which segregation is
explicitly named as a form of discrimination. 133 In a footnote, the
majority opinion states that, "unlike the ADA, § 504 of the Rehabilita-
tion Act contains no express recognition that isolation or segregation
of persons with disabilities is a form of discrimination."1 4 Since this
change of language is the main reason the majority gives for diverging
from precedent established through its own case law, this change
ought to be discussed at length in the opinion, rather than merely
mentioned in two footnotes.1 3 1 Instead, the majority's opinion relies
solely on the view that the express language of the ADA mandates
considering unnecessary institutionalization discrimination, and since
Congress and the Department of Justice both endorse that view, this
128. Id. at 410.
129. See Olmstead v. Zimring, 119 S. Ct. 2176, 2196 (1999) (Thomas, J, dissenting).
130. Compare Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287 (1985), and Southeastern Community
College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 297 (1979), with Olmstead, 119 S. Ct. 2176, and Helen L. v.
DiDario, 46 F.3d 325 (3d Cir. 1995) (showing that the Court was less willing to impose a
burden on the states by finding discrimination under § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act but
recently, under Title II of the ADA, courts have been more willing to hold states in viola-
tion and order those states to make changes in services and benefits to the public).
131. Olmstead, 119 S. Ct. at 2186.
132. See id
133. See id at 2187.
134. Id
135. See id. at 2181, 2186.
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Court assumes no further reasoning is needed."3 6 The majority's con-
clusory reasoning may lead to inconsistencies in future lower court
decisions, since this opinion gives little guidance for determining
when a particular situation should be considered unnecessary institu-
tionalization, and therefore discrimination, under Title II of the ADA.
The Court avoids deciding under what test for discrimination to
analyze the facts of this case by concluding that since Congress de-
fined segregation as a form of discrimination,' 7 unnecessary institu-
tionalization is forbidden by Title II of the ADA.'" 8 The language on
which the Court relies so heavily is found in 42 U.S.C. § 12101, the
"findings and purpose" section of the ADA."' As Justice Thomas
notes in his dissenting opinion, these findings should not be con-
strued narrowly because, "when read in context, the findings instead
suggest that terms such as 'segregation' were used in a more general
sense." 14° The language of the findings section is general and descrip-
tive;1 4 ' and therefore it is difficult to view this section as establishing
mandatory requirements.'4 2 The majority justifies its classification of
unjustified institutionalization as discrimination by deferring to the
Department ofJustice's opinion that such segregation is itself discrim-
ination under Title II of the ADA.'4 ' By using such conclusive reason-
ing, the majority avoids the difficult test used in discrimination cases:
finding a class of similarly situated individuals with whom to compare
the plaintiffs to show that disparate treatment on the basis of plain-
tiffs' disabilities has occurred.' 4 4
136. See id at 2186-87.
137. See Olmstead 119 S. Ct. at 2186-87 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (a) (2), (a)(5) (1994),
which describe segregation as a form of discrimination faced by people with disabilities).
138. See id
139. See id. at 2181, 2186-87; see also supra note 137 and accompanying text.
140. Otmstead, 119 S. Ct. at 2197 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
141. Section 12101 (a) also states, "discrimination against individuals with disabilities
continue [s] to be a serious and pervasive social problem," and, "individuals with disabilities
are a discrete and insular minority who have been faced with restrictions and limitations,
subjected to a history of purposeful unequal treatment, and relegated to a position of
political powerlessness in our society." 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (a) (2), (a)(7) (1994).
142. For example, § 12101 (a) (1) states that 43 million Americans are either physically
or mentally disabled, and (a) (8) says, "the Nation's proper goals regarding individuals with
disabilities are to assure equality of opportunity, full participation, independent living, and
economic self-sufficiency for such individuals." Id § 12101(a). However, interpreting
these two passages as requirements would mean that unless 43 million people throughout
all 50 states are employed and live on their own, the ADA has been violated. Such is clearly
beyond Congress' intent in enacting the ADA.
143. See Olmstead, 119 S. Ct. at 2186.
144. See id
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In lieu of authority for its per se definition of discrimination, the
majority explains how the practical consequences of unnecessary insti-
tutionalization support the notion that such institutionalization is a
form of discrimination.' 45 The majority comments, "[r] ecognition
that unjustified institutional isolation of persons with disabilities is a
form of discrimination reflects two evident judgments,"'46 which are:
(1) institutionalized individuals are often subject to negative stereo-
types regarding their ability to participate in society, and (2) institu-
tionalization restricts individuals' freedom in their everyday lives.
14 7
While both of these unfortunate consequences may result from undue
institutionalization, they do not speak to the issue of whether unjusti-
fied institutionalization is itself a form of discrimination.' 48 As Justice
Thomas explains in his dissenting opinion, "we cannot expand the
meaning of the term 'discrimination' in order to invalidate policies we
may find unfortunate."'4 9 So while the negative outcomes of unneces-
sary institutionalization may lend support in an analysis of whether
such act constitutes discrimination under the commonly used dispa-
rate-impact test, these consequences do not lead to the conclusion
that unjustified institutionalization is per se discrimination.
C. Narrowing the Broad Per Se Definition of Discrimination
Although the Court's conclusion that unnecessary institutional-
ization is itself discrimination leaves a seemingly broad category in
which many activities could be considered discriminatory, the Court
limits this category by outlining two requirements for what constitutes
unjustified institutionalization for those "qualified individuals with a
disability" who may not "be subjected to discrimination."' 50 First, the
individual must be deemed qualified to live in a community-based
treatment center by one of the State's professionals.15 ' Otherwise, the
Court explains, "it would be inappropriate to remove a patient from
the more restrictive setting."' 52 In his concurring opinion, Justice
Kennedy emphasizes the importance of deferring to the professional's
145. See id. at 2187.
146. Id.
147. See id&
148. See id. at 2199 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
149. Id. at 2197 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (referring to NLRB v. Highland Park Manufac-
turing Co., 341 U.S. 322 (1951)).
150. Id. at 2187-88 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12132) (1994).
151. See id. at 2188.
152. Id.
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opinion regarding the appropriateness of community-based care for
any given patient.1 53 He warns,
it would be unreasonable, it would be a tragic event, then,
were the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA) to be
interpreted so that States had some incentive, for fear of liti-
gation, to drive those in need of medical care and treatment
out of appropriate care and into settings with too little assist-
ance and supervision.
154
The majority's emphasis on the importance of a professional opinion
before an individual is removed from an institution should prevent
future courts from sustaining frivolous claims of discrimination due to
segregation.
To counter the possibility of the State placing all patients in com-
munity-based treatment in order to avoid ADA discrimination law-
suits, the Court added the second requirement that an individual
must want to leave the institution for community-based care.'55 The
Court is justified in establishing this pre-requisite since there is not a
"federal requirement that community-based treatment be imposed on
patients who do not desire it."'5 6 Once a disabled individual has met
the two requirements, if the State refuses to place the individual in a
community-based treatment center, the State has discriminated
against that individual, according to this Court's interpretation of Ti-
tle II of the ADA.' 57
The Court mentions in passing that dissimilar treatment, a com-
monly required element in discrimination suits, may exist in the pres-
ent situation. 5 ' The Court explains that mentally disabled
individuals, in order to obtain necessary medical services, must "relin-
quish participation in community life they could enjoy given reason-
able accommodations, while persons without mental disabilities can
receive the medical services they need without similar sacrifice.' 59
Justice Kennedy's concurring opinion elaborates on this point by out-
lining the possible ways in which a case of discrimination under a dis-
parate-impact, similarly-situated comparison test may be found to
exist."b He maintains that it is an issue that should be decided on
153. See id at 2191-92 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
154. Id. at 2191 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
155. See id. at 2188.
156. Id.
157. See id.
158. See id at 2187.
159. Id.
160. See id. at 2192-93 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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remand to the district court, as opposed to dismissing it outright as
the majority does."' The dissent comments that the dissimilar treat-
ment mentioned by the majority "results merely from the fact that
different classes of persons receive different services - not from 'dis-
crimination' as traditionally defined." 62 However, the majority does
not rely on, nor even develop, this concept of discrimination, since its
conclusion that undue institutionalization is a form of discrimination
in and of itself eliminates the need for further analysis.
163
D. Relaxed Reasonable Modifications Standard
After disposing of the discrimination issue, the Court addresses
the "reasonable modifications" regulations." These regulations re-
quire states to make reasonable modifications to avoid discriminating
against individuals on the basis of disability, unless such modifications
would "fundamentally alter the nature of the service, program, or ac-
tivity. '  The Eleventh Circuit's interpretation of these regulations
was very strict, allowing the State to use a financially over-burdened
defense only on rare occasions.1 6 6 Given the Supreme Court's conclu-
sion that unnecessary institutionalization is discrimination under the
ADA, such an interpretation would require the State to allocate a sub-
stantial portion of its budget to community-care services in order to
place all qualified individuals in such care, yet at the same time main-
tain institutions for those disabled individuals in need of institutional-
ized care. 67 The majority states, "the Court of Appeals' [Eleventh
Circuit's] construction of the reasonable-modifications regulation is
unacceptable for it would leave the State virtually defenseless once it is
shown that the plaintiff is qualified for the service or program she
161. See id. at 2193-94 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (explaining that "the issue whether
respondents have been discriminated under § 12132 by institutionalized treatment cannot
be decided in the abstract, divorced from the facts surrounding treatment programs in
their States.")
162. Id. at 2199 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
163. The Third Circuit dealt with this same issue in DiDario and when discussing the
part of 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a) (3) that describes institutionalization as discrimination, that
court stated, "if Congress were only concerned about disparate treatment of the disabled as
compared to their non-disabled counterparts, this statement [§12101(a)(3)] would be a
non sequitur as only disabled persons are institutionalized." Helen L. v. DiDario, 42 F.3d
325, 336 (3d Cir. 1995). The need for analysis of similarly-situated persons was thus elimi-
nated when the Third Circuit adopted the notion that unjustified institutionalization is a
form of discrimination, and the Supreme Court employed similar reasoning four years
later in Olmstead.
164. See Olmstead, 119 S. Ct. at 2188.
165. 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(7) (1997).
166. See Zimring v. Olmstead, 138 F.3d 893, 902 (11th Cir. 1998).
167. See Olmstead, 119 S. Ct. at 2188-89.
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seeks."'" Such an unreasonable outcome is not what Congress nor
the Attorney General intended when enacting the ADA and promul-
gating the corresponding regulations.' 69
This Court's interpretation does not set out a bright-line rule for
when modifications are reasonable, and therefore required, but
rather sets guidelines under which decisions must be made on a case-
by-case basis. 7 ' The Court explains, "sensibly construed, the funda-
mental-alteration component of the reasonable-modifications regula-
tion would allow the State to show that, in the allocation of available
resources, immediate relief for the plaintiffs would be inequitable,"
particularly in light of the number of disabled individuals, with a mul-
titude of various disabilities, for whom the State provides services.171
So while the result of the first issue with which the Court dealt, dis-
crimination, resulted in a broad, inclusive rule, the Court's ruling on
the reasonable-modifications regulations sets limits on that rule.
Therefore, the final holding in the case requires the states to "provide
community-based treatment for persons with mental disabilities when
the State's treatment professionals determine that such placement is
appropriate, the affected persons do not oppose such treatment, and
the placement can be reasonably accommodated, taking into account
the resources available to the State and the need of others with mental
disabilities,"172 which is a reasonable and functional interpretation of
Title II of the ADA.
E. Possible Negative Consequences of Court's Holding
One possible negative practical application of the Court's ruling
in this case unfolds when comparing this case with several cases de-
cided in the past under § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. In both Davis
and Halderman, the relief sought by the claimants did not exist in the
given state and would require that state to create a new program.173
The Court was not willing to place such a burden on the states without
explicit instructions to do so from Congress, which the Court did not
find to exist in the legislation in question in those cases. 1 7 4
168. Id. at 2188.
169. See id. at 2189-90 (discussing, in footnote 16, that the standard imposed by the
Eleventh Circuit is impermissibly stricter than the "undue hardship" standard used in a
similar regulation that corresponds to § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act).
170. See id.
171. Id. at 2189.
172. Id. at 2190.
173. See Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 413 (1979); Pennhurst
State School and Hospital v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 27 (1981).
174. See Davis, 442 U.S. at 411; Halderman, 451 U.S. at 19.
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On the other .hand, in both DiDario and Olmstead, community-
based programs already existed in their home states when the claim-
ants brought suit.17 5 Therefore, the state is bound to abide by the
ADA while providing those services, as the Eleventh Circuit, in Zimr-
ing, explains, "having chosen to provide services to individuals with
disabilities, the State - both the state officials charges with formulat-
ing the budget as well as the state agencies responsible for mental
health services - must act 'in a manner [that] comports with the re-
quirements of [the ADA].' "176 Comparing the two lines of cases, one
can conclude that once a state has a particular program in place to
serve disabled individuals, the Court views subsequent requests for ac-
commodations as within the "reasonable modifications" requirement.
But if such program does not exist at the time suit is brought, requir-
ing states to create one is a "fundamental alteration" and is beyond
the power of the ADA.
Having drawn this conclusion, it is possible to imagine states opt-
ing not to create programs and services for the disabled in the first
place, out of a fear of prosecution for ADA violations. While this pos-
sibility may seem unlikely, to states with financial troubles, the Court's
decision in Olmstead, read in light of previous decisions, may indicate
that services for the disabled is an area in which money could be
saved, and possible litigation avoided, by simply not providing certain
services. Obviously, the Court did not intend such a consequence as a
result of its holding, however it is conceivable that the ruling may be
interpreted in this way, particularly when comparing it to previous
cases with opposite outcomes.
V. CONCLUSION
The Court in Olmstead broadened the definition of discrimina-
tion to include unjustified institutionalization. 77 Fortunately, this
definition applies only in suits brought under Title II of the ADA and
results in punishment for the states only if other conditions are also
met.'78 Without these limiting requirements, the Court's holding
could have opened the door to a deluge of litigation from patients in
175. See Olmstead, 119 S. Ct. at 2183; Helen L. v. DiDario, 42 F.3d 325, 329-30 (3d Cir.
1995).
176. Zimring v. Olmstead, 138 F.3d 893, 904 (11th Cir. 1998) (quoting DiDario, 46 F.3d
at 339).
177. See Olmstead, 119 S. Ct. at 2185.
178. See id at 2181.
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varying degrees of institutionalization.179 Instead, the Court added
three pre-requisites to a court finding that a state's failure to place
mentally disabled patients in community-based treatment constitutes a
violation of the ADA's proscription on discrimination, successfully
preventing a flood of litigation. As a result, the complete standard the
Court developed for analyzing discrimination claims under Title II of
the ADA is rational and equitable. In other words, the test adopted in
Olmstead furthers one of the goals of the ADA: "to provide clear,
strong, consistent, enforceable standards addressing discrimination
against individuals with disabilities."'
179. Institutionalization is a term this Court did not have to define, but which conceiva-
bly could be an issue in future cases under the per se definition adopted by the Court.
180. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b) (2) (1994).
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